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Abstract 
Managers operate in an environment characterised by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and 
ambiguity. This paper focuses on uncertainty and demonstrates how managers are mitigating 
supply-side uncertainty through the use of temporary employment contracts. These temporary 
employment contracts are being used as real options where uncertainty is reduced by 
reducing irreversibility and by increasing flexibility. The empirical work comprised in-depth 
interviews with employees and employers in the academic sector, a sector that has a tradition 
of employing people on temporary contracts. The key findings are: temporary employment 
contracts provide the organization with a low-risk mechanism for reducing uncertainty in 
supply; temporary employment contracts increase flexibility and reduce irreversibility for the 
organization and shift risk from the institution to the employee. However, there is a cost to 
the organization in the form of demotivation, holding back and early exit of desirable 
employees. It can also lead to an organizational division between staff employed on 
temporary contracts and those on permanent contracts. The paper has relevance to managers 
and decision makers who operate in sectors or levels where human resource abilities are 
initially opaque but are revealed over time.  
Key words: real option, temporary employment, contract, uncertainty, flexibility, 
irreversibility, risk 
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Strategic use of temporary employment contracts as real options 
 
Managers operate in an environment that can be characterised as volatile, uncertain, complex 
and ambiguous (Ashill and Jobber, 2013; Bryan and Farrell, 2009; Yarger, 2006:18). This 
paper looks at one of these environmental elements -uncertainty – and the management of 
such uncertainty through a novel application of real options theory. A real option is the right 
but not the obligation to carry out an action at some future point in time (Adner and 
Levinthal, 2004). Real options reduce the impact of environmental uncertainty by increasing 
organizational flexibility and reducing the irreversibility of decisions (Foote and Folta, 2002).  
 
The paper examines the use of temporary employment contracts as a form of real option 
whereby uncertainty in the supply of human resources is mitigated by passing some of the 
risk involved in recruitment from the employer to the employee. Whereas temporary 
contracts are often used to mitigate uncertainty in demand, this paper examines their use in 
managing uncertainty in supply, specifically the supply of opaque human resource abilities. 
In particular, the paper examines the use of temporary employment practices in academia, a 
sector where it is common practice to initially hire academics on time-limited contracts 
(Bryson and Blackwell, 2006). It looks at the usage of temporary contracts from the point of 
view of both employees and employers, drawing on the constructs of flexibility, 
irreversibility and uncertainty from real options theory.  
 
The main contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that organizations use option-based 
temporary employment contracts to strategically reduce uncertainty in supply of human 
resource abilities. Temporary contracts provide organizations with the flexibility to evaluate 
an employee’s performance and to decide at some later date, when the employee’s 
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performance has been more fully revealed, whether or not to continue with the services of 
that employee. The organization makes a lesser decision upfront – the offer of a temporary 
contract. It delays its major decision – the offer of permanent employment – until a later point 
in time when more information has become available. The option to discontinue with an 
employee on temporary contract strategically reduces the irreversibility that is typically 
inherent in the employment decision. In this way use of temporary contracts as real options 
actively shifts risk from the organization to the employee. It was also found that using real 
options such as temporary contracts to reduce uncertainty comes at a cost to the organization 
including demotivation of and holding back by employees, early exit of desirable employees, 
and the creation of a division between those employees on permanent contracts and those on 
temporary contracts. The paper continues a long line of research in this journal into strategic 
aspects of the management of human resources (Christiansen and Higgs, 2008; Nguyen et al., 
2013; Neirotti, 2013; Wei, 2013). 
 
1. Real Options 
A real option is the right, but not the obligation, to undertake a business decision at some 
future point in time (Adner and Levinthal, 2004). Real options allow organizations to keep 
costs down until uncertainties are resolved or until new information becomes available (Folta 
and O'Brien, 2004; Folta and Miller, 2002; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; McGrath, 1997; 
McGrath and Nerkar, 2004; O'Brien et al., 2003).  Real options involve a two-part decision: 
the first part is the creation of an opportunity without an obligation; the second part is a 
subsequent decision, after an elapse of time and consequent reduction in uncertainty, to 
continue with the opportunity or to disengage.  They provide the benefit of a 'wait and see' 
period following the first decision, during which uncertainty may reduce. Organizations make 
smaller initial investments with lesser commitment, prior to pursuing full investments with 
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much larger commitment at a later date. The initial trial investment serves to hold the option 
open for the organization prior to making a later larger full-scale investment. This allows 
organizations capture potential gains while avoiding the risk of large losses (Bowman and 
Hurry 1993; Coff and Laverty, 2001; Razgaitis, 2009).  
 
The concept of uncertainty is central to the theory of real options. Without uncertainty 
options have no value and would not exist; it is the presence of uncertainty that gives an 
option its value. Knight, an early researcher into uncertainty in a business context (Runde, 
1998), regards the future as largely unknowable, that business decision makers have only 
‘imperfect knowledge of the future’ (Knight, 1921: III.VII.2), and that the uncertainty 
regarding future events is ‘not susceptible to measurement and hence to elimination’ 
(III.VII.48). Indeed in Knight’s view grappling with uncertainty justifies the existence of the 
manager (he uses the term entrepreneur) and leads to economic profit. A second key concept 
of real options is irreversibility i.e. the recognition that decisions can be difficult or 
impossible to reverse. Pindyck (1991: 1110) equates irreversibility to ‘sunk costs that cannot 
be recovered’. He gives as an example relevant to this paper: ‘investments in new workers 
may be partly irreversible because of high costs of hiring, training and firing’ (p.1111). The 
third key concept in options theory is flexibility (Berk and Kaše, 2010): i.e. the ability of a 
firm ‘to alter its initial operating strategy in order to capitalize on favorable future 
opportunities or to react so as to mitigate losses’ (Foote and Folta, 2002: 582). Foote and 
Folta (2002) give examples of two sources of flexibility created through use of options: the 
ability to delay a major decision until uncertainty has reduced and the ability to abandon a 
project or resource. They point out that flexibility is inherent in the definition of a real option: 
the asymmetry between the right, but not the obligation, to go through with a decision. 
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While the origins of real options theory lie in the field of finance (Black and Scholes, 1973; 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Lee et al. 2007) the methodology has also been applied to non-
financial or real assets (Luehrman, 1998; Gilroy and Lucas, 2006; Kauffman and Li, 2005; 
Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2004) as 'both disciplines [finance and strategy] attempt to obtain 
the highest possible return on risky assets' (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999:25).  A number of 
authors have applied real options theory to strategic investment decisions (Anderson 2000; 
Smit and Ankum, 1993; Trigeorgis, 1996). Leslie and Michaels (1997) suggest that 
organizational strategies can be improved in four ways by applying real options theory: 
opportunities will be emphasised (decision makers who adopt a real options approach are less 
afraid of uncertainty as this is taken into account in the real options decision making process), 
leverage will be enhanced (decisions can be made incrementally as new information comes to 
light), rights will be maximised (the decision maker has the right to carry out an action at 
some future point in time) and obligations will be minimised (the decision maker is not 
obliged to carry through with an intention). Bowman and Hurry (1993) discuss strategic 
decisions within a real options framework referring to an ‘options chain’ whereby an option 
is recognised and taken up and, when new information becomes available over time, 
decisions are made with regard to furthering or abandoning the option. Malos and Campion 
(1995, 2000) examine strategic human resource development decisions from a real options 
point of view.  
 
Several writers have developed terminology for types of real options (Kyläheiko et al., 2002; 
Trigeorgis, 1993).  Amram and Kulatilaka (1999) identify types of options as: timing options, 
growth options, staging options, exit options, flexibility options, operating options and 
learning options.  Brach (2003) classifies real options into six broad categories: the option to 
grow, option to delay, the option to abandon, the option to expand or contract, the option to 
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switch, and the compound option - a combination of any of the above options. Janney and 
Dess (2004) describe five different types of real options: immediate entry, immediate exit, 
delayed entry, delayed exit and complete exit. The immediate exit option is relevant to this 
study as it provides the benefit of making full commitments reversible.  The organization 
commits some funds up front which gives it 'the right to avoid an irreversible decision' 
(Janney and Dess, 2004: 63), i.e. it can terminate the option quickly. An example is the hiring 
of an employee on a temporary employment contract. The organization can decide, as new 
information becomes available over time, to extend the temporary employment contract, 
terminate it or indeed give the employee a permanent employment contract.  Grinyer and 
Daing (1993) point out that having the option to exit a project can be an important influence 
on the decision to adopt the project in the first place. 
 
A number of researchers have examined temporary employment from the point of view of 
real options. Badders et al. (2007) suggest that an organization that employs temporary rather 
than permanent employees is exercising a real option that offers the organization a great deal 
of flexibility. Foote and Folta (2002) predict that increased environmental uncertainty and 
irreversibility should lead organizations to resort to increased use of temporary employment. 
They argue that hiring permanent employees is irreversible due to at least four conditions: 
labour market rigidities, explicit commitment, implicit commitment and the lack of an 
internal labour market.  The option to defer or abandon when new information becomes 
available is attractive, hence the use of temporary employees. Bhattacharya and Wright 
(2005) suggest that much uncertainty relates to hiring because of the largely irreversible costs 
associated with recruitment, training and benefits, as well as maintenance of employees, costs 
regarded by Jacobs (2007) as sunk.  
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2. Temporary Employment 
Traditionally, managers use temporary employees to replace permanent employees for 
reasons of absence, for example illness or holidays, or to deal with unexpected increases in 
business (Burgess and Connell, 2005 and 2006; Houseman, 2001).  Nowadays, however, 
many organizations regard temporary employees as a critical part of their human resource 
management strategy with positions at executive, managerial and professional levels being 
occupied in a temporary capacity (Applebaum, 1987; Foote, 2004; Hipple and Stewart, 1996; 
Marler et al., 2001). While for many employees 'impermanence is becoming permanent' 
(Rubin, 1995: 310) for others temporary contracts are ‘stepping stones’ into permanent work 
(Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). 
 
The proportion of people employed on temporary employment contracts in organizations in 
European, North American and Pacific Rim countries is growing (Anderson et al., 1994; 
Barling and Gallagher, 1996; Belous, 1989; Dale and Bamford, 1988; Delsen, 1993; McLean 
Parks et al., 1998; Polavieja, 2002). Carnoy et al. (1997) reported that temporary employment 
in France grew from three percent to ten percent from 1980 to 1993, while forty percent of 
the Japanese workforce was either self-employed or temporary, with similar proportions in 
the UK. Von Hippel et al. (1997) reported, between 1991 and 1993 in the United States, 
twenty percent of new jobs were temporary. This growth is driven by multiple organizational 
objectives, for example: cost reduction, increased flexibility, and less responsibility for direct 
management of employees (Nollen and Axel, 1996; Pfeffer and Baron, 1988). 
 
While much research has been undertaken in the area of temporary employment (Abraham, 
1988; Barry and Crant, 1990; Koh and Yer, 2000; Mangum et al., 1985; Voudouris, 2004), 
research into the area of temporary employment contracts is scarce (Burgess and Connell, 
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2006; Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Ellingson et al., 1998; Mitlacher, 2006) and still at an 
early stage (Connelly, 2004).  McLean Parks et al. (1998) have suggested that empirical 
investigations are in short supply and advised on the need for a broader framework for 
distinguishing between or analysing different types of employment arrangements and 
relationships.  Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993) also posited that research in the area is hampered 
by the lack of a framework; Wright and McMahan (1992:316) advise that it is an area 'in 
need of a solid theoretical foundation to guide both research and practice'. 
 
Temporary employment is widespread in academia. Bryson and Blackwell (2006: 208) point 
out that in the UK Higher Education sector '53 percent of the 134,000 academic staff [in 
higher education institutions] are employed on temporary contracts'.  They suggest that no 
other sector in the UK employs so many professional employees in this manner and refer to 
similar patterns in Europe, the USA and Australia.  Brown et al. (2010) advise that casual 
employees accounted for 11 percent of fulltime equivalents in 1990 in Australian universities, 
increasing to 29 percent by 2001 and reaching between 40 and 50 percent by 2008. In the US 
the proportion of faculty positions that were part-time or temporary in nature had increased 
from 20% in 1967 to 43% by the year 2000 (Feldman and Turnley, 2004). In Ireland it is 
common practice to initially hire younger academics on short term contracts (Finn et al., 
2007:68). 
 
Temporary employment in academia is regarded as 'precarious' employment 'where risk is 
transferred from the employer to the employee' (Bryson and Blackwell, 2006: 208). It is a 
strategy 'to encourage numerical flexibility' (Bryson and Blackwell, 2006: 209) through the 
recruitment of disposable employees (Bryson, 2004) or invisible faculty (Husbands, 1998). 
Short and fixed term contracts provide 'the way in which turbulent labour markets and 
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financial insecurity has been passed on to the workforce' (Bryson and Blackwell, 2006: 209-
210). Brown et al. (2010: 170) suggest academic institutions have 'begun to resemble a 
flexibilised factory' and outline that university management are committing themselves to 
'flexiblisation strategies' or 'permanent flexibility' (Shumar, 1995: 94). Authors highlight 'a 
clash between flexibility and quality' in Australian higher education (Brown et al., 2010: 171; 
Musselin 2005). Bryson (2004: 41) notes a 'transfer of power from academic autonomy to 
managerial prerogative'. Kimber (2003: 43-44) suggests that 'the introduction of private 
sector management practices into the public sector' has led to an agenda of 'pressuring higher 
education institutions to cut costs and seek 'flexibility' in staffing and in responding to 
fluctuations in enrolments'.  
 
Van Emmerik and Sanders (2004) suggest that academic institutions increasingly rely on 
temporary employment contracts as a way to achieve staffing levels without having to make 
long term commitments. They suggest temporary employees offer the institution a source of 
flexibility, providing the opportunity to delay the largely irreversible decision of hiring 
permanent employees while assessing the competence of the temporary employee. The 
response of universities has been to relieve themselves of responsibilities associated with 
tenure and this in turn has 'contributed to the emergence of a two-tiered academic workforce - 
the tenured core with security and good conditions and the tenuous periphery with insecurity 
and poor conditions' (Kimber, 2003: 41).  
 
Much of the research into temporary employment in academia has been carried out in 
Europe. In France, the use of short term contracts has multiplied (Bonnal and Giret (2010) 
with few graduates being recruited into academia without first going through a temporary 
position (Mangematin et al., 2000). In Germany, graduates are expected to take up multiple 
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contracts with the road to permanency being 'long, selective and risky' (Musselin, 2005: 141) 
and the procedure ‘complex and protracted’ (Enders, 2002: 499). Elsewhere, extensive use of 
temporary contracts results in graduates 'queuing at the doors of the academic world' (Robin 
and Cahuzac, 2003: 1) or in 'waiting positions' (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez, 2005: 5; 
Recotillet, 2007: 475) and with reduced attachment to their profession (Feldman and Turnley, 
1995).   
 
3. Methodology 
The literature review has identified that while real options theory has been applied 
conceptually to temporary employment contracts no empirical work has been carried out in 
this area to date. This research project sets out to address this gap using the three key 
concepts from real options theory as a conceptual framework (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 
19): increase in flexibility through increased choice (to retain or to let go the employee); the 
ability to delay the major decision until more information is available; reduction or at least 
diminution of irreversibility by having the option to terminate the time-limited employment 
contract; and the consequent reduction in the impact of uncertainty (see figure 1).  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 approximately here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
To carry out the empirical work the researchers adopted a qualitative research approach based 
on case-study methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2014). A qualitative 
approach allowed the researchers explore and interpret the use of option based temporary 
employment contracts in their natural setting (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005) and emphasising 
their real-world context (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In practise this took the form of a 
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series of semi-structured interviews (Saunders et al., 2009: 323) with third level employees 
and employers.  
 
A total of nineteen in-depth face-to-face interviews were carried out, nine on the employee 
and ten on the employer side. The interviews took place in interviewees’ own offices and 
lasted between sixty and ninety minutes. The interviews themselves were semi-structured 
(Bernard, 2006: 212), drawing on a set of questions (Bryman and Bell, 2011: 467) based on 
specific topics derived from the temporary contracts and real options literatures. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. Data from the interviews was analysed and coded 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990) using the main categories derived from the real options and 
temporary contract literatures: uncertainty, flexibility, irreversibility, probation, retention, 
exit, risk. Further categories emerged during the analysis process: vocation, motivation, 
commitment, holding back, exploitation and balance of risk. The interview process continued 
until signs of theoretical saturation (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:188) indicated that further 
interviews would add little to the development of categories.  
 
Employee interviewees were chosen from a complement of 65 full-time academic staff in the 
business faculty of a European third level academic institution. Of these, nine academic 
employees agreed to take part in the research, five of whom were employed on temporary 
employment contracts while the other four had been initially employed on temporary 
employment contracts but had since become permanent. These employees were all full-time 
faculty members engaged in teaching and research; all of those interviewed were carrying out 
the primary activities of the organization, not working on special or time-limited projects. 
The employees interviewed typically held or had held temporary employment contracts of 
one year or three years duration. On the employer side of the employment contract, the 
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researchers interviewed all four Deans of the same university as the employees interviewed, 
along with senior human resources managers from five of the ten third level educational 
institutions located in the same city.  
 
The concepts of validity and reliability are applied differently in qualitative research than 
they are in quantitative research where there exists a battery of statistical tests to support the 
demonstration of reliability and validity (Bryman and Bell, 2011: 394). With regard to 
qualitative research projects it is vital that the research design is plausible and credible and 
that the evidence or data collected is also plausible and credible (Silverman, 1993: 155). In 
this research project the researchers have taken a number of precautions to ensure plausibility 
and credibility. The chosen sector has an extensive and well documented history of temporary 
employment as has the specific organization examined making them suitable sites for an 
intensive examination of this topic. All interviewees were either professional career-oriented 
academics who have personally experienced temporary contract situations or academic 
managers who have extensive experience of employing people on temporary contracts. All 
interviewees had extensive experience of the academic sector and how that sector works. 
Data was collected from interviewees on both sides of the employment contract providing 
two contrasting perspectives and reducing the likelihood of informant bias over-influencing 
the results (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Lengthy interviews carried out in interviewees 
own offices ensured that interviewees could speak freely and without external bias, allowing 
the researchers collect rich data thick with description (Seale, 1999: 107). The tightly 
bounded set of constructs, derived from the literature, allowed theoretical saturation to occur 
relatively quickly. Collection and analysis of data took place contemporaneously (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007) allowing the researchers to keep abreast of and have ongoing discussion 
of the research process, data and findings as the research project progressed.  A number of 
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‘exemplar quotes’ from the data were noted during the analysis; such selective verbatim 
quotes from respondents, used in the findings section, can ‘lead the reader to understand 
quickly what it took you [the researcher] months or years to figure out’ (Bernard, 2006: 503). 
Finally, the researchers draw on Siggelkow’s (2007) argument that the case study is a 
valuable and robust research approach providing an opportunity for in depth study of a 
specific situation with the potential to yield exceptional insight into a topic area.   
 
4. Findings 
The data suggest that employees on full-time but temporary employment contracts sensed a 
lack of commitment to them by the organization leading to demotivation, restriction of 
contribution and holding back of abilities. They also found themselves distanced from 
employees on permanent contracts who tended not to engage with them until they became 
permanent. On the other hand, employees were grateful to have a temporary contract rather 
than no contract at all: it gave them teaching experience, an opportunity to publish from their 
PhD and provided an initial step to an academic career; however, successive temporary 
contracts were disliked by employees. The main objective of employees was to attain a 
permanent position at the end of the temporary contract; when achieved, permanency tended 
to increase employee commitment to the organization. Lecturers on temporary contracts 
nevertheless experienced strong emotional ties to their work. 
 
Employees viewed temporary employment contracts as a pseudo probationary period 
increasing their uncertainty about their future. While employees perceived this as a transfer of 
risk from the organization to themselves, they desired that this risk be balanced between 
organization and employee and, if overly imbalanced, they understood that they too had an 
option - to leave the organization - and were prepared to take up that option if necessary. 
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Employees did not perceive the organizational context as overly uncertain and consequently 
did not see the need for the organization to resort to use of temporary employment contracts. 
 
The data suggest that employers were very deliberately using temporary contracts to provide 
the organization with increased flexibility. Employers recognised that academic employment 
was vocationally driven and that employees were prepared to accept temporary employment 
contracts even though they desired permanent work; employers were aware however that 
employees on temporary contracts could still choose to exit the organization early. Employers 
strategically used such contracts as periods of extended probation, to staff for risky projects 
and to stimulate ‘churn’ in the industry. Employers recognised that employees could be seen 
as ‘pawns’ in the academic game and that extensive deliberate use of temporary contracts 
could be seen as exploitative. The findings are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Temporary contracts: the employee perspective   
Employees looking to establish a foothold in academia were satisfied with a temporary 
employment contract: ‘I had just come out of a PhD programme so what I wanted then 
effectively was a couple of years to be able to produce publications. So [temporary] from my 
perspective was fine’ (D); ‘[The temporary employment contract] had given me four years to 
show what I could contribute’ (F).  
 
However, limitations imposed by temporary employment contracts were noted: ‘Now when 
you are in the job you say well there is so much more I can do from here’ (D); ‘if you wanted 
to move on past individual research, if I want to grow a research programme, I need to take 
on a number of PhD students, I need to acquire external funding... then definitely it 
[temporary contract] would be a huge preventative from being able to move forward with that 
15 
 
sort of work’ (D). Another interviewee advised: ‘there is at least a full workload of a very 
specialist area and I think that could continue to develop’ (A).  
 
Several interviewees pointed out that a temporary contract indicated a lack of commitment to 
them by the organization and this in turn mitigated their own full commitment to the 
organization: ‘the worst thing about a short-term contract is that it is de-motivating’ that it 
‘would delay a full contribution’ (A); ‘I strongly disagree with continuous temporary 
contracts because that will affect motivation’ (I). Another questioned ‘should I go the extra 
mile?  Is it worth it?  Is it going to be appreciated?’ and ‘you don't really know how much it 
is appreciated or regarded within the institution’ (H).  
 
Employees felt restricted by the time limit on their employment contract: ‘There are certain 
elements of academic work that you would not begin, for example, the supervision of a PhD 
student, bidding for research money. If you did not know you were going to be here four 
years from now it would be terribly unfair to take on a PhD student’ (A); ‘you are concerned 
in the sense that, will I be around here in two years’ time? It is not fair to take on somebody if 
you are not going to be here. So that would be a concern’ (D). The organization itself 
restricted the task set asked of the temporary employee: ‘if you are on a one year contract you 
teach more because you are not supposed to have administrative and research responsibilities’ 
(A).  
 
Temporary employees were seen as being in a holding position and permanent colleagues 
held back from full involvement with them. A number of interviewees spoke of the 
remoteness of their relationship with permanent colleagues and with the institution: ‘I do see 
there is a difference in the way you are viewed by the institution. I think the institution is 
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prepared more to invest in you when you are permanent’ (E); ‘people view the permanent 
position as [where] you can really build and you can really develop’ (D).  
 
Despite being temporary, interviewees had a strong emotional tie to their positions: ‘I am on 
a contract here and I cannot leave in the middle of it because you cannot leave a class in the 
middle of a semester. Information could get around’ (G). Another advised: ‘I had come to 
like the academic life and was happy to stay with it. I tried it and liked it’ but ‘You do not 
want any black marks’ (E). Some employees had few other alternatives available: ‘there are 
no other [academic institutions] at the moment in Ireland where I could have a full role’ (A).  
 
The aim of most employees on temporary contract was to attain a permanent lecturing 
position: ‘obviously what you are trying to pursue long-term is a permanent position’ (D); 
‘my hope would be that I would be offered or manage to get a full-time post’ (A); 
‘permanency would be the ultimate goal’ (G).  
 
Permanency was associated with increased affirmation, security and increased commitment: 
‘I got affirmation in the best way possible that I was making a contribution, that I was adding 
value and [I was] happy to continue doing that’ (B); ‘There is a huge difference. Being 
permanent you become more committed, more secure so I could fully concentrate on my job 
without thinking of what I am going to do for the next year so I can be fully committed’ (I); 
‘You would like to be offered at least a permanent contract.  [It] gives you more security and 
sense of belonging. Also I think to a certain degree it impacts on your commitment. You are 
committing to something and putting so much work into something that you do not know if 
there is anything for you next year’ (H).  
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Permanency was also seen by employees as good for the organization: ‘When I got the 
permanent role I could allocate my time more effectively.  I can make my research more 
productive.  I can manage my time, teaching and research better’ (I); ‘[If permanent] you can 
pull in longer term projects particularly say funding for research projects; they are always in 
five-year blocks’ (D). Employees adjusted their behaviour to suit the temporary contract and 
then adjusted again on attaining permanency: ‘with temporary, you really have to gear 
everything just for the three years; anything that will help your case at the end is worth doing. 
Whereas now I do not have that scenario…I would take on different sorts of things - more 
strategic and long term’ (E).  
 
Uncertainty, flexibility and irreversibility: Employee perspective  
Interviewees clearly regarded the use of temporary employment contracts as pseudo-
probationary periods: ‘You can see from the employer’s perspective that they have two, three 
or four years to see if they want to keep someone’ (F); ‘it can be a way for them to filter as 
they tend to go for people who will bring in research funding… by having one [or] three year 
contracts they can make sure that it is the person they want and are going to keep’ (H).  
 
Interviewees were keenly aware that the use of temporary employment contracts made their 
future more uncertain: ‘uncertainty was one of the key concerns’ (I) and ‘Uncertainty I really 
dislike. The thing of being secure this year and next year but the following year I will be back 
to square one again’ (A).  In a similar vein: ‘[there was] lots of uncertainty in terms of… the 
three-year contract or one year contract … [the important thing is] elimination of uncertainty’ 
(B). 
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The flexibility associated with temporary employment contracts was largely seen by 
employees as advantageous to the institution as it transferred risk to the employee: ‘definitely 
the [institution is] maintaining flexibility and the risk is transferred to the individual because 
they may not have the work down the road’ (C); ‘the employee incurs the risk, there is only 
so much flexibility’ (F). 
 
Employees stressed the importance of balancing the risk between both parties to the contract 
or else employees may be forced to leave early: ‘There needs to be a balance between what 
[the institution] is gaining and what the individual is gaining. If that balance becomes out-of-
kilter, I think there is a serious issue then because people are already motivated, they are 
looking outside, and they are looking for another [institution]’ (A); ‘they [the employer] 
probably have created the risk that they still need the [employee] in a year's time but [the 
employee] won't be available to them then. That would appear to be the risk they have 
created’ (C); ‘At the end of this year if I was not made permanent I would just leave because 
I think it would not be right for me and then the risk would be totally on my side’ (A). It was 
pointed out that use of temporary employment contracts is ‘a high-risk strategy if it is 
overused in an academic context’ (A).  
 
Nevertheless, most interviewees felt the temporary employee shouldered the greater burden 
of risk: ‘The risk is with me I think more than the [institution]’ (D); ‘I think overall it weighs 
more favourably on the side of the employer’ (G); ‘I felt at the time [the risk was] almost 
entirely on my side’ (E); ‘the staff member has more risk’ (C); ‘obviously they would be able 
to replace me’ (A).  One interviewee said: ‘[it is] definitely a seller's market in terms of 
academia… colleges can afford to engage in short contracts because they are not worried that 
some other institute will snap you up because there is a scarcity of posts. So the risk is 
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definitely higher for an employee. I do not see any risk for the employer’; that interviewee 
went on to point out that in a year where the country produced 920 PhD graduates there were 
less than fifty available posts.  
 
Employees queried the level of environmental uncertainty to which the institution was 
subjected and the justification for use of temporary contracts: ‘The [institution's] business is 
less unpredictable or less uncertain than other business’ (I); ‘In this environment to be quite 
honest, contract work does not seem to add anything because they have certainty…I do not 
see a need in this industry’ (C); ‘they [the employees] are stretched and yet the [institution] is 
very loathe giving long-term contracts’ (B).  
 
Employees suggested that the institution chooses to set a short time horizon with respect to 
employment: ‘I think it is more likely that [institutions] do not want to commit to long-term 
commitment to a human resource. Therefore, they will make the shortest possible decision 
that they have to’ (A). Employees accepted these contracts under some duress: ‘I would not 
even have accepted it normally but it was just the circumstances’ (A); ‘I was willing to take it 
but I was not very excited about a one-year contract’ (H). One outcome of this is that the 
organization must repeatedly invest in new people: ‘It is sliding down the snake every year. 
You build that person up the ladder and then that person leaves because they are on a one-
year contract’ and so ‘they keep on turning over people’ (B). 
 
Temporary contracts: the employer perspective 
Interviewees on the employer side emphasised the importance of flexibility to the 
organization and that temporary contracts increased flexibility for the organization: ‘Our 
mantra is flexibility and adaptation’ (J); temporary employment contracts: ‘certainly allow 
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flexibility’ (J). This is in contrast to the rigidity inherent in permanent contracts: ‘once you 
employ a permanent member of staff then you have the fixed-cost that has to be covered 
whereas the flexibility of [temporary employees] allows that’ (J); ‘unless you get a retirement 
or you increase your complement you do not really have a lot of flexibility’ (M).   
 
The ability of the organization to exit from the contact provided a source of flexibility: ‘If the 
[temporary employee] does not work out for whatever reason, their contract is simply not 
renewed… there is no commitment to the employee’ (P); ‘No question and unambiguously - 
there is no commitment to [them] here, we will not commit anything to [them] in the long 
run’ (L).  A by-product of this flexibility was that the organization could be more 
experimental in its hiring: ‘you are more likely to be more innovative, a bit more risk taking’ 
(R).   
 
The nature of hiring was ‘vocationally driven’ (J) with newly recruited lecturers ‘coming in 
because they are bringing in specialist knowledge.  Some of them want to do it because it 
gives them kudos in the sense that they are getting real life experience through teaching’ (J).  
 
Employers appeared to be following a deliberate strategy of shifting from permanent to 
temporary employment: ‘there may be a growing appreciation to have fifteen or twenty 
percent of your workforce on a flexible temporary model’ (Q).  Another interviewee outlined: 
‘We appointed people on fixed-term contracts and our rule of thumb was roughly this, if 
hitherto the position would have been appointed on a permanent basis, then we will appoint 
on a fixed-term basis’ (O).  A further comment made was: ‘we just issue them with a contract 
that covers a defined period of time’ (N).   
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Differing views were expressed as to the level of environmental uncertainty in the sector. On 
the one hand: ‘each year we do not know what the level of student applications is going to be 
like, whether they are going to be up or down or even will certain programmes become 
unpopular all of a sudden, and what was once a cash-cow is now no longer attracting people 
so that is where uncertainty comes in from year to year’ (N). On the other hand: ‘It is only 
uncertainty of how much and when, not is the [institution] going to close?  Are we going to 
be sold?  Are we going to be merged?  So is there uncertainty?  My view is there is no real 
uncertainty’ (Q). There was some evidence of temporary contracts being used to mitigate 
demand uncertainty: ‘[the institution] would hire people on temporary contracts to see how a 
programme flies’ (Q). 
 
Employers appeared to deliberately use temporary contracts to extend the period of employee 
probation: ‘In recent years we have had strong revenue streams in some areas but in those 
very areas it is very hard to get suitably qualified people to take on permanent posts... we got 
candidates with core competence but not the full set, those people would have been offered 
temporary posts’ (K); at a later time the temporary employees ‘would then apply for the 
permanent post when it becomes publicly advertised’ (K). There are however risks to the 
employee. They may have demonstrated insufficient competency: ‘If they are not cutting it 
they are gone’; and even if they have the job could still go to an even more qualified person: 
‘you have to have an open competition.  If somebody comes in from outside in those 
circumstances then the internal candidates are not going to get the job.  We have had those 
situations’ (L). The temporary contract option mechanism is also not without risk to the 
organization: ‘while somebody is in that arrangement they can perform out of their skin and 
once you give them [permanency], the performance drops off" (N); and ‘these stars did not 
turn out to be stars’ (Q). 
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Temporary contracts were also used to manage demand or staff riskier projects: ‘initially we 
will offer temporary employment contracts but our aim would be to move to permanent 
contracts if things work out’ (P). Such action is perfectly in line with real options thinking: 
writing an option now and exercising that option some time later.   
 
Employers were aware of the risk of a temporary employee leaving early: ‘I think that the 
employee is much less secure in their continuation of their services if they are on a temporary 
contract because they will be looking around and be thinking of that particular horizon’ (K); 
‘if they are good, that [their leaving] is a real risk’ (Q). This risk is increased due to the 
international orientation of the academic community and the loyalty of academics to their 
profession, often ahead of their institution: ‘Academics are mobile generally and because 
there are faculties internationally there is always the risk’ (R); ‘if somebody's reputation is 
good, they meet each other at conferences and there is a risk that somebody is poached’ (Q). 
However the risk was perceived as small: ‘I do not think it is a particular risk at the moment’ 
(Q) and could be mitigated by the offer of permanency: ‘[organizations] want the ability to 
hold onto people and permanency gives them that’ (Q). 
 
There was some evidence that the build-up of temporary contracts was a way to stimulate the 
churning of employees. Employers pointed to a relatively rigid labour market: ‘the retention 
levels are so good that it actually becomes a problem’ (Q); ‘there are not a lot of people 
moving on, then you have basically got blockage’ (M) and that some churn was desired: 
‘what you are looking for is a balance… you are looking for reasonable churn’ (O), and 
‘there are occasions you would wish there was churn’ (O). Temporary employment contracts 
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were a means of ‘refreshing the expertise cadre in the [institution] on a reasonably regular 
basis’ (O) and ‘enriching, bringing in experience you do not have on your staff" (M).   
 
One employer appeared to view hiring as a game and that employees ‘need to know the game 
of what education is all about … [and] may find that they are actually lured to the game and 
may want to move from industry into the game of education’ (J). This respondent theorised 
that employees from industry ‘found the excitement of education being more reactive… you 
are renewed easier each year with new students coming in; you do not have the monotony of 
doing the same sort of things’ (J).   
 
Employers were aware that temporary employment contracts pose difficulties for employees: 
‘I think you will find a lot of frustration’ (M); ‘[a temporary contract] causes a bit of 
schizophrenia with regard to the [temporary] staff who feel it is their module but yet they are 
not in control’ (J). Employers were also aware that use of temporary employment contracts 
could be seen as exploitative of new lecturers: ‘The exploitation argument is always one we 
are very worried about’ (J) and ‘[temporary employees] are always the manipulated element 
of the resource’ (J); and ‘I would worry that they are being just used as pawns to over extend 
the flexibility’ (J).  
 
5. Discussion 
The research findings demonstrated that academic institutions rely on temporary employment 
contracts as a way to achieve staffing levels without having to make long term commitments, 
supporting the previous work of Carmichael (1998), Mangematin et al. (2000), Musselin 
(2005), Recotillet (2007) and Van Emmerik and Sanders (2004). The research also supported 
the work of Robin and Cahuzac (2003), Bonnal and Giret (2010), Finn et al. (2007), 
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Mangematin et al. (2000) and Musselin (2005) who suggest that early careers of academics 
are characterised by periods of temporary work and long waits before permanent employment 
becomes available. The findings also support Feldman and Turnley’s (2004: 284) argument 
that academics on temporary contracts experienced ‘relative deprivation’ compared to their 
permanent colleagues. 
 
Flexibility, irreversibility and uncertainty are important in the context of organizational 
decision making and performance (Lukas, 2007; Musshoff and Hirschauer, 2008). When 
uncertainty is high, flexibility and reversibility are particularly important (Van de Vrande et 
al., 2006). The findings in this paper provide support for Atkinson’s (1984) theory of the 
flexible firm with its core of permanent staff surrounded by a periphery on a variety of 
flexible contracts. Use of temporary employment contracts, in situations where employees 
desired permanent work, provided increased flexibility to the organization. The institution 
enabled reversibility, retaining the ability to exit from decisions which could prove costly 
(O'Sullivan, 2002; Wenger and Kalleberg, 2006).  
 
The level of environmental uncertainty influences an organization's choice of employment 
contract mode (Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy, 2005; Neirotti, 2013) and some of this 
uncertainty can be shifted from the organization to the employee through the use of 
temporary employment contracts (Kennelly-McGinnis, 1991; Foote and Folta, 2002). This 
shifting of risk from the organization to the employee is supported by the data collected in 
this research project. The institution gains from the use of a temporary contract as an option 
as it has flexibility to retain or let go the employee at the end of the contract period. If it 
chooses to retain the employee it does so with far greater knowledge of the employee’s 
ability and fit with the institution. The institution therefore has shifted some risk from itself to 
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the employee: the employee does not know if he or she will be kept on by the organization 
after the temporary contract period has expired.  
 
Foote and Folta (2002: 592) suggest that real options theory predicts that ‘greater 
irreversibility and environmental uncertainty should lead to a greater propensity to outsource 
employment (i.e. hire temporary workers)'. This research project however showed that third 
level academic institutions were perceived by interviewees as being subjected to relatively 
little environmental uncertainty and yet the institutional hiring policy clearly fostered 
flexibility and irreversibility. Interviewees appeared to resent the organization for using 
temporary contracts in a situation that they, the interviewees, perceived to be low in 
uncertainty. It is well-known that temporary employment contracts are used to increase 
flexibility so that organizations can adjust their workforces to changes in demand (McKay, 
1988; Way, 1988). This research shows that temporary employment contacts are also being 
used to manage uncertainty in supply: they provide a mechanism that allows employee ability 
to reveal itself more fully before the organization decides whether or not to make a long term 
commitment to the employee. 
 
The findings also support the suggestions in the literature that temporary employment 
contracts are used as screening devices in employee selection (Jacoby, 1999; Williamson, 
1991) and act as ‘stepping stones’ to permanent work (Engellandt and Riphanh, 2005). 
Employers and employees alike acknowledged that the organization was giving the 
temporary employee a start in academic life and a period of time to show what they could do. 
The organization was eliminating the risk that the employee might not work out; the 
organization avoids committing to them long term. Temporary employment contracts allow 
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the organization terminate the employee quickly at relatively low cost and in this respect are 
a form of immediate exit option (Janney and Dess, 2004).  
 
Temporary contracts restricted employees who in turn tended to hold back on their areas of 
contribution, become demotivated and at the limit leave the organization. Employees 
questioned the institution’s commitment to them and felt they could not contribute fully in 
their role. They felt restricted in delivering as much as they would like to due to the time limit 
on their contract: in essence, ‘holding back’ (Feldman and Turnley, 1995). This implies that 
organizations in turn may not be benefiting from the full skill set or full efforts of employees.  
On the other hand, employers anticipated that extended probation could spur employees into 
exceptional performance but were concerned as to whether or not these high levels of 
performance would be sustained after permanency. While employers seemed happy to 
stimulate more ‘churn’ of employees in the industry, employees tended to see the regular 
turning over of employees as wasteful. 
 
Ironically, many interviewees felt an emotional tie to their work and by extension to the 
organization and were reluctant to leave before the end of their contract period. Others felt 
tied in to the contract as to leave early would risk blotting their copybook in a close-knit 
academic world. There is an irony here as permanent employees could leave the organization 
by handing in one semester’s notice. Because of these emotional ties, there was a perception 
among employees of exploitation of the situation by the organization. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Making the right employment decision is critical for an organization as true employee 
abilities may be difficult to discern and permanency difficult to reverse. This research project 
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explores new ground as it is the first paper to empirically examine temporary employment 
contracts from a real options point of view. This paper found that temporary employment 
contracts are being used by employers as risk mitigation mechanisms within a context of 
organizational uncertainty. While the concept of temporary employment is well-known this 
research looked in-depth at exactly how temporary contracts increased flexibility and reduced 
irreversibility thereby mitigating uncertainty. Employers used temporary employment 
contracts to reduce supply-side uncertainty and to shift risk from employer to employee. 
Temporary contracts were regarded by employees and employers as extended pseudo-
probationary periods. Employers were found to deliberately view employee hires as real 
options and exercised, or not, those options at end of contract. Employees on temporary 
contracts were also clear that an option had been taken out on them.  
 
Financial options have a price and so too do real options. This research project demonstrated 
that the organization also pays a price when taking out a real option on a human asset. 
However, the price of human-based options is different in nature to that of existing options. 
In contrast to financial options and other real options the asset (i.e. the employee) has the 
ability to influence the operation of the option. Employees may therefore choose to work 
harder. However, employees also sense the transfer of risk from the organization to 
themselves and the lack of commitment on the part of the organization and may become 
demotivated during the contract period, working less effectively as a result. Employees can 
choose to hold back on their efforts and rein in their abilities, especially if they come to 
believe that the contract will not be extended. Permanent employees also hold back from 
engaging with temporary employees until they have been made permanent. Desirable 
employees may make an early exit from the organization in order to take up a better or more 
certain offer elsewhere. These side effects - demotivation, early exit, and holding back by 
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both temporary and permanent staff – represent the cost to the institution of taking out the 
option. An enhanced version of the research framework, based on these findings, is given in 
figure 2. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 approximately here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
It is clear from the research that many of the employees interviewed found it difficult to see 
the source of uncertainty from the point of view of the organization. Employees perceived the 
environmental context as relatively certain and temporary contracts as unnecessary. 
Employees however largely misperceived the motivation of the organization which was to 
mitigate uncertainty in the supply side and not the demand side, the side for which temporary 
contracts are traditionally used. The organization was using temporary contracts as a vehicle 
for revealing difficult to observe abilities in suppliers of services, in this case employees. This 
use of temporary contracts has relevance not only to academia but also to other sectors such 
as hiring of senior executives where opaque resource capabilities can be revealed over time 
using option-based time-limited contracts. 
 
The paper provides four lessons for managers. First, it provides a solid illustration of a novel 
use of a real option: as a temporary employment contract. Second, it provides a novel way of 
viewing temporary employment contracts and a new language, drawn from real options 
theory, for discussing and examining them. This is particularly useful in a field that many 
researchers feel is in need of a solid theoretical foundation (Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993; 
Wright and McMahan, 1992). Third, the paper shows how temporary employment contracts 
increase the flexibility of an organization by delaying the major investment decision and 
giving it an additional choice: not to continue with the employee. Using an option-based 
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temporary contract makes the employment decision reversible. Fourth, the paper 
demonstrates that this comes at a cost to the organization: the employee may lose motivation, 
may hold back on their full effort, or may exit early. However, employers appear to under-
appreciate the nature and extent of these costs.  
 
The study has a number of practical implications for managers. First, it is clear that 
temporary contracts used as real options can provide additional desirable flexibility at 
organizational level. Second, although such flexibility may be desirable (Guest, 2004) 
managers need to be careful that they do not alienate their workforce in the longer term. 
Employees eventually made permanent will remember their temporary period with the 
organization: a negative initial experience may generate longer run dissatisfaction. Third, 
managers need to be aware that systematic use of option-based temporary contracts may lead 
to the creation of a two tier organization: a protected core set of employees and a tenuous 
periphery (Atkinson, 1984); the organization will need to ensure that such a structural 
arrangement fits with its long run strategy, or else take precautions to avoid it becoming 
embedded. Fourth, systematic use of option-based temporary contracts will eventually 
become known to the outside world and may make the organization less attractive to high 
calibre recruits; such reputational risk may not be in the organization’s best interest. Fifth, 
extensive early exit of employees may result in the organization becoming a training ground 
for staff who move on to other organizations; this may deplete the human capital (Wright et 
al., 1994) of the organization while at the same time increase that of its rivals. The overall 
impact on the organization of the avoidable voluntary dysfunctional turnover of desirable 
employees can be surprisingly costly (Griffeth and Hom, 2001: ch. 1). 
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The research has specific implications for human resource and general managers. They must 
take into account not only the service provision (Nguyen et al, 2013) elements of temporary 
contracts but also their strategic benefits and costs as identified in this paper. There is a 
danger that, although such contracts provide flexibility, they may inadvertently lead to 
misalignment of HR and business strategies (Christiansen and Higgs, 2008). HR managers 
must develop ways of maintaining employee motivation in the absence of full commitment to 
them by the organization, minimising holding back by employees, spotting the signs of early 
exit and taking precautions to hold onto desirable employees, and reducing the divide 
between temporary and permanent employees who all carry out similar roles. General 
managers also must carefully weigh up the benefits and consider the full costs of using 
temporary contracts when contemplating the hiring approach. While stimulating churn and 
revealing opaque employee ability may be important, the strategic HRM literature warns that 
‘the most important assets of any business walk out the door at the end of each day’ (Allen 
and Wright, 2006: 4). By extension, a manager will not want desirable but semi-permanent 
(Wernerfelt, 1984) human resource walking out of a temporary contract early. This is all the 
more so when these human resources have specific but opaque abilities that are tacit 
(Mueller, 1996), difficult to imitate, likely to be rare, and may be valuable (Barney, 1991) 
and therefore a potential source of future organizational competitive advantage (Wright et al., 
1994). 
 
There are also specific implications for academic managers, Deans, Provosts and Vice-
Chancellors. Flexible contract arrangements that transfer risk from the organisation to the 
employee provide an economic benefit to the organisation, one that may be particularly 
attractive when funding sources are under threat. However, academic managers may not be 
fully weighing into their decision calculus the economic cost of holding back and other 
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adverse behaviours identified in this research. Also, such behaviours may reduce opportunity 
for identification and development of synergies in teaching and research activity between the 
two tiers of staff. The long run implications of the development of a two-tier academic 
workforce - with employees in temporary and permanent tiers carrying out the same job but 
under different employment conditions - are also unclear. This research identified the 
existence of a division between employees on permanent contracts and those on relatively 
long but nonetheless temporary contracts. Increasing use of ever more precarious temporary 
contracts (Chakrabortty and Weale, 2016; O’Hara, 2015; Stein, 2015) may lead to even 
greater division between permanent and temporary staff tiers. Institutionalising such deep 
division among faculty may not be in the long run best interest of academic organisations. 
Academic managers also need to consider the long run consequences of using a tier of 
employees divided from the main body of the organisation to carry out a significant element 
of its mission. 
 
An interesting area for further research is to further examine the balance of risk to the 
organization between early-exit of valuable employees and reduction in uncertainty regarding 
opaque employee abilities through use of option-based temporary contracts.  A second area of 
further research is to extend formal real option theoretical models to incorporate situations 
where the asset itself can influence its own value and therefore the cost of taking out the 
option. A third area is to examine the extent to which mobility of employees moderates the 
use of option-based temporary employment contracts. For example, less use may be made of 
such contracts in mobile environments where early exit of desirable employees may occur 
more frequently. Fourth, a further more detailed study of the impact of option based 
temporary contracts on the nature of the work itself could be carried out, for example: the 
impact on academic freedom or on autonomy of academics. Fifth, the impact of the extensive 
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use of option based temporary contracts on permanent staff may provide a fruitful area for 
further research. Finally, the strategic costs to the organization of demotivation, holding back, 
early exit, and division between tiers merit further and deeper investigation. 
 
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, the data was largely drawn from a 
single academic institution in a single national context and therefore care must be taken in 
generalizing from the study. Second, the data was drawn from a public sector organization 
and care must be taken in generalizing to the private sector where rules around hiring and 
firing are different and irreversibility of employment contracts less entrenched. It would be 
interesting to extend this study to other sectors where temporary contracts are extensively 
used, for example retail, or to areas of work where time-limited contracts are regularly used, 
for example senior executive appointments. Third, the study took a qualitative approach 
which provides great insight but with less precision than would a quantitative study. Future 
quantitative studies could be carried out using questionnaires and statistical analysis tools to 
explore more precisely the constructs examined qualitatively in this paper.  
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Figure 1:  Research framework based on constructs from real options theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Enhanced framework based on research findings 
 
 
